January 05, 2015
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9 Ways the Eurozone is More Fragile than the US
I may be best known for
predicting the global financial crisis and the housing bust of 2008 — but I
made another key economic prediction when I warned of major structural risks
threatening the Eurozone in 2006.
My remarks proved as
prophetic as I'd feared. The crisis I predicted then is still casting
shockwaves through the world economy, and may do so for generations to come.
At the World Economic Forum
in Davos, Switzerland that year, I said that imbalances in the Eurozone would
come to a climax — which might lead to a disaster in Europe within 5 years.
I made my remarks at a panel
discussion on the “Ups and Downs of EMU” (European Monetary Union). The panel
included several key European finance officials — including Jean-Claude
Trichet, who was then president of the European Central Bank (ECB).
In a nutshell, I explained
that some countries within the Eurozone — especially Italy, Portugal, and
Greece — would experience weaker growth than the economically strong countries
at the core of the Eurozone, such as Germany.
This kind of economic
divergence would be a major threat to a currency union like the Eurozone, where
countries’ inflation rates and interest rates converge.
As I was explaining all this,
the Italian finance minister threw a temper tantrum: He interrupted my remarks
and began shouting, "Go back to Turkey!" (The minister was making
reference to my being born in Turkey — despite having spent two decades living
in Italy.)
Unfortunately, by the Spring
of 2010, many of the concerns I expressed during that panel discussion in 2006
turned out to be well founded.
Let's take a look at some of
the highlights — or, perhaps more accurately said, the low lights — of the last
five years in the Eurozone to set the context.
"The Euro sculpture is partially reflected in a puddle on a
cobblestone pavement in front of the headquarters of the European Central Bank
(ECB) in Frankfurt January 21, 2012."
CREDIT: REUTERS/KAI PFAFFENBACH
Source: reuters.com
CREDIT: REUTERS/KAI PFAFFENBACH
Source: reuters.com
- In May of 2010, the Greek
government was thrown into chaos by a debt crisis; ultimately, Greece was
forced to accept a bailout from the IMF and EU, to agree to implement
austerity measures in return, and eventually in 2012 to restructure in a
coercive way its public debt.
- By June of 2010 the member
states of the Eurozone were forced to create The European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) a temporary crisis fund that had to lend over
€100 billion to Ireland, Portugal, and Greece after those countries made
formal requests for much needed assistance.
- In the autumn of 2012, the
member states of the Eurozone created an additional fund called the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The ESM lent nearly €50 billion to Spain
and Cyprus to backstop their banking crises by recapitalizing their banks.
- Perhaps even more significant,
earlier in the summer of 2012 Mario Draghi, the president of the European
Central Bank, pledged to do "whatever it takes to preserve the
euro." This was a very strong commitment on the behalf of the ECB to
use the full force of monetary policy to save the Eurozone.
- By 2013 several Eurozone
economies received various forms of bailouts from the troika (IMF, ECB and
EU): among them on top of Greece were Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and Spain.
As a consequence of these
interventions and Band-Aids, the Eurozone has survived — but now, as we enter
2015, the Eurozone has a host of economic problems that emergency stopgap
measures simply cannot fix.
* In this map, please note the differences between the members
of the EU that are in the Eurozone, which is the currency union for which the
euro is the official currency, and members of the European Union, like The
United Kingdom and Sweden, which participate in an economic free trade zone.
Source: spiegel.de
Source: spiegel.de
The Eurozone: A Brief
Timeline of the Troubles
So what, exactly, is
happening inside the Eurozone now? The problems of the Eurozone are, of course,
complex, but for the sake of brevity let's take a look at a few of the most
disturbing facts that seem to highlight the key difficulties that now exist
there:
- The overall inflation rate in
the Eurozone now stands at 0.3% — which demonstrates insufficient demand
for goods and services – and now the EZ is at risk of outright deflation.
- The overall rate of
unemployment in the Eurozone is 11.5%.
- While 11.5% unemployment is
shockingly high by American standards, it doesn't really give you a true
sense of just how bad the problem is in the so-called PIGS nations
(Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) of Europe. In Greece & Spain, for
example, the unemployment rate is 25%; even more disturbing, though, the
rate of youth unemployment in both of those countries is about 50%, which
gives you some sense of the level of desperation and hopelessness among
young people there.
- In Italy, the rate of youth
unemployment is above 30%. Italy's output is 8% below pre-crisis levels,
but industrial production has collapsed 25%. In Italy, this is not
just economic stagnation — it's industrial depression.
In fact, it would be fair to
say that the Eurozone is just one shock away from outright deflation — a
nightmarish state of affairs where a sustained lack of demand and economic
growth causes prices to fall.
Some people say Europe is
going to get 'Japanified' — a reference to Japan's dismal economic performance
over the last twenty years, which is sometimes referred to as 'The Lost Two
Decades'.
But, in fact, the risks in
Europe are even worse. While the Japanese have stagnated, Japan has not
suffered the sort of debt crisis that’s affected the Eurozone. This is because,
unlike the Eurozone, the Bank of Japan has the flexibility and willingness to
monetize debt and print money. It's much easier for a national, independent central
bank to act to bail out one country than for Frankfurt to attempt to bail out
the divergent economies of the Eurozone, where there is no easy
one-size-fits-all monetary policy solution to save the day.
Rather than get lost in the
wonky math of the Eurozone, as macroeconomists so often do, I’d like to tell
you about the challenges the Eurozone faces in a slightly more interesting way:
By comparing it to a familiar organization of states—the United States of
America.
The Eurozone & The
United States
1) Rise of Extreme
Political Parties
SYRIZA rally. Photo by SYN Flickr
Source: links.org.au
Source: links.org.au
If the 20th
Century has taught us anything, it’s that difficult economic times often lend
themselves to political radicalism. Both the left and right seized this
opportunity last century and wreaked havoc. The Bolsheviks rose to power after
the Russian empire collapsed following economic decline and WWI. Enthusiasm for
the National Socialists in Germany followed a prolonged and intense period of
deflation and depression.
Seventy-five years later, we
would be wise to worry if it might happen again. Among the most troubling
concerns on the horizon for the Eurozone is the rise of Eurosceptic extremist
parties. Most of these parties tend to come from the political right, but there
are examples on the left as well, such as Podemos in Spain or—more
worrisomely—Syriza in Greece, a well-organized left coalition that is leading
in polls and poised to win a majority in the upcoming election late in January.
Marine La Pen’s National
Front party in France is a perfect example of how such extreme national
movements must be taken seriously. For decades, the National Front was merely a
nuisance, a hotbed for rightwing cranks and malcontents. Suddenly, in 2014, the
National Front won a significant number of mayoralties, and their national
numbers continue to grow. (In fact, if presidential elections in France, which
are scheduled for 2017, were held today, current polls show that the National
Front would win the first round.) They're no longer fringe—they’re now players
in a very dangerous game. But, just as we saw in the 1930s, stagnation and
insecurity breed resentment.
When hard times hit, the public looks for someone
to blame: foreigners, globalization, or budget cuts from Brussels.
Even in Italy populist
anti-Euro parties of the right and left could beat moderate centrist parties of
the right and left if the current prime minister Renzi fails in his reform
drive.
We should not underestimate
the potential power of these movements. The United States is not free of such
disgruntlement, of course, but the Tea Party in the U.S. is now more of a
nuisance and a political sideshow than a threat.
In short, Europe has a very
different kind of history — one it ought to take seriously.
2) Europe's Aging
Population
Not long ago Jared Diamond
popularized the phrase “geography is fate.” I would pair a phrase of my own
beside this wise remark: demographics are fate too.
Source: weknownext.com
Credit: Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM)
Credit: Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM)
According to a recent article
in the Economist, in the next fifty years the working-age population of Europe
will drop considerably, from last year’s peak of about 300 million to 265
million. This will be a significant blow to nearly every aspect of the Eurozone
economy.
At the same time, the old-age
dependency ratio--a fraction or percentage expressing the ratio of residents
over the age of 65 to those under that age--will rise from 28% (recorded
earlier this decade) to a staggering 58% by 2060.
This situation is, in a word,
unsustainable.
The causes of this challenge
are in Europe are manifold: declining fertility, advances in old-age care, the
residue of baby-boom demographics. But the impact will be serious.
The United States has managed
to combat many of those challenges of an aging population through immigration.
In the U.S., Immigrants now make up more than 13% of the total. population. In
2013, the number of immigrants living in the United States, both legally and
illegally, topped 40 million.
Immigration may help to
mitigate Europe's aging challenge, as it has in the United States — and then
again it may not. Immigration is a controversial topic in Europe — and it is
one of the many issues that extremist parties in the Eurozone have seized upon
to attempt to lend themselves legitimacy within their own cultures.
Foreigners, after all, have always made easy targets for extremist political
parties seeking to scapegoat others for their domestic economic woes in times
of high unemployment.
3) Susceptibility
to External Shocks
One of the reasons the
Eurozone is more fragile than the United States is pure geography. America is
surrounded by huge oceans, with relatively stable and like-minded countries to
the north and south. Europe, on the other hand, is only a peninsula off the
much larger and much less stable continent of Eurasia.
And Africa and the Middle
East are right there too, a short skip across the Mediterranean. Thousands of
refugees drown in that sea trying to reach Europe each year. Pope Francis
recently made reference to this tragedy when he described the continent as a
“vast graveyard.”
The aging population of
Europe grows resentful of the influx. And because of a wide variety of social
and historic reasons, Europe does not function as a melting pot, the way
America, at its best, can do. (We see this drive toward assimilation in
President Obama’s recent executive action, removing penalties for undocumented
residents who aim to attain citizenship.) Whereas Germany, by contrast,
contains plenty of Turks who have lived in that country for fifty years and
still cannot apply for a German passport. They don’t feel like citizens. They
can’t own a part of the dream.
Europe still has not finished
the task of absorbing the former Iron Curtain countries of Central and
Eastern Europe within the EU. Problems there still persist—as recent events
involving Mr. Putin have made clear.
Source: russia-eastern-republic.com
Eurasia is not an easy
neighborhood in which to live. And because Europe cannot make centralized
decisions to the same extent that a country like the United States can,
coordinating responses to these periodic crises is always a struggle.
4) Labor Mobility &
Capital Mobility
There is less labor mobility
in the Eurozone than in the United States, since cultural barriers exist between
nations with thousands of years of independent history. In the US, workers may
flee a recession in North Carolina to seek work in the Northern cities. If
there’s a bad shock in Michigan, people can pack up and move to New York. The
borders are open between US states and the language is the same. Benefits are
often portable. Whereas in the Eurozone, a number of obstacles prevent
this.
While there are mechanisms to
allow for free movement between Eurozone countries, such as the establishment
of the Schengen Area, which allows people to travel without passports between
26 European nations, the Eurozone still has a number of constraints that aren't
present in the US which make movement more difficult. The Eurozone is a motley
collection of competing languages, cultures, and legal restrictions. In
consequence, Europe lacks the crucial shock absorber of a truly open labor
market.
Source: meristation.com
Since the time of Alexander
Hamilton, the United States has had an integrated, federalized banking system
which allows for the free flow of capital. This advantage has made the US a
good deal more nimble and resilient than the Eurozone. While capital mobility
exists in the Eurozone, there is not enough of it. Investing abroad in other
Eurozone countries means navigating different tax systems, legal systems, often
in different languages and cultures. As a U.S. citizen, if you live in
Connecticut and want to buy stock in a California tech company, you don't even
need to think about it.
You don't have to call a different broker. You
simply buy the stock. The absence of free movement of capital, in fact, is
entirely alien to the American way of thinking.
5) Asymmetric Adjustment
Asymmetric adjustment is a
wonky phrase but it’s fairly straightforward to understand. Basically, what it
means is that there is an asymmetry between creditors and lenders, borrowers
and debtors when it comes time to adjust to economic shocks to the economy.
In the Eurozone, this means
that countries that tend to spend too much (for example, Greece and Italy) and
those that tend to save too much (for example, Germany and The Netherlands)
both get hurt when the flow of money ceases.
When a shock to the economy
arrives, the lending tends to dry up. In this scenario, debtor countries are
forced to spend less — but nothing forces the lending countries to adjust and
save less. This is what is meant by the phrase 'asymmetric adjustment.
For both sides, though, an
unstable equilibrium is thrown out of balance. The so-called PIGS countries
bristle against austerity, while the core countries, on the other hand, are
left in the position of someone playing tug-of-war when the other side suddenly
drops the rope.
Source: mariashriver.com
In the U.S., such a scenario
could never arise. We are one unified economy. It's difficult to even draw the
same metaphor. New York may lend more money that West Virginia, as we know, but
both are states are parts of the same union.
6) Great Recession
Response
After the banking crisis of
2008, the United States did three crucial things that were required to fix the
economy right.
Bank Recapitalization
First, The United States took
the bull by the horns and recapitalized the banking system. The U.S. Treasury
department committed trillions of dollars to support US banks and other
financial institutions, such as investment banks, money market funds and credit
unions.
(While trillions of dollars
were pledged to help the banks, far less capital was actually committed, and
the government has collected billions of dollars in dividends and fees for
their investment.)
Once government capital was
injected into U.S. banks, those banks could continue lending — as opposed to
selling assets, deleveraging, or contracting credit. In addition, the Federal
Reserve in the U.S. forced banks to engage in stress tests to determine their
solvency. Five years down the line, the ECB eventually performed similar stress
tests.
But even after the stress
tests, European banks don't have adequate capital, which means that if the
banks need to shore themselves up, they are going to start retrenching and
contracting credit — which risks further damage to the Eurozone economy.
Monetary Policy
Second, the US did aggressive
monetary and quantitative easing, while the ECB is now still thinking about
doing quantitative easing. I've written before in
Roubini's Edge about how monetary policy can help soften the blow of recessions
and economic slowdowns but here I'd like to just focus on the big picture. By
quadrupling the size of the money supply from its pre-recession levels, the Fed
freed up desperately needed credit and helped keep the U.S. economy from
crashing into a full-blown depression.
The Marriner S. Eccles Federal Reserve Board Building in
Washington, D.C.
Source: blogs-images.forbes.com
Source: blogs-images.forbes.com
Back-Loaded Fiscal
Consolidation
Third, the US back-loaded its
fiscal consolidation, meaning it postponed measures aimed at balancing its
fiscal budget. (This is because, in the short run, raising taxes and cutting
spending reduce disposable income and therefore reduce consumption.) In the
Eurozone, however, the decision was made to front-load fiscal
consolidation, which put additional pressure on their already beleaguered
economies. This front-loading, which amounted to imposing budgetary austerity,
reduced the total demand in the economy — the last thing the countries of the
Eurozone needed at the time of a serious recession.
7) The Eurozone isn't a
Fiscal Union
Seat of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France
Source: enar.dk
Source: enar.dk
One of the key challenges to
the Eurozone is a lack of fiscal union. A fiscal union is something Americans
take for granted and rarely think about. In the US, when there is a shock to
the output of one of our fifty states, fiscal transfers from the rest of the
union help to cushion the blow. As an example, let's say there is a
negative shock to the economy of Texas, perhaps due to a fall in oil prices.
Economic output in Texas would fall. But for every dollar in lost output, the
fall in income in Texas isn't a dollar but only about 60-65 cents.
Because when there are bad
times in Texas the federal government transfers economic assistance there — on
the premise that when there are bad times somewhere else, booming oil prices in
Texas might help out another state in the union. It's a kind of risk pooling
and insurance. In the scenario we've been discussing, Texans who were laid off
from their jobs would be eligible for unemployment benefits.
Those same
unemployed Texans might also be eligible for federal welfare benefits. Also,
when the earnings of Texans decrease due to bad economic times they would
automatically pay less federal income tax. Conversely, when Texans are
doing well, their federal taxes automatically rise. This serves as a kind of
automatic stabilizer for the economy. Finally, the federal government can
decide to cushion an economic shock to Texas by spending more money on Texan
infrastructure or by funding federal projects at, say, the Johnson Space Center
in Houston.
In the U.S. those shock absorbers
at the federal level are considerable, since the federal government accounts
for 25% to 30% of our GDP. In Europe, where the EU government only accounts for
1% of GDP, there simply isn't capacity for it to lend substantive assistance
when countries are in trouble . So what winds up happening in the Eurozone is
that when you have a $1 shock to the GDP of one country, that country's income
goes down, effectively, by $1.
Unless there is a full fiscal
union in the Eurozone — on spending, taxation, and even common debt issuance
—the funds that the central government will have to assist countries in trouble
will remain just spare change. Of course there are many reasons why citizens of
some countries in the Eurozone don't want a fiscal union, which is a topic I
will take up in the next section...
8) Banking Union: The
Eurozone's Stumbling Block
In the United States, we take
for granted that every state in the union has banks that are insured by the
FDIC. In Europe, however, German deposit insurance pays only for German banks,
and Italian deposit insurance pays only for Italian banks.
Seat of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, Germany
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg
In the U.S., on the other
hand, when a bank goes bankrupt in California, we use the same pool of money to
fix the problem as we would for a bank that goes bust in New York. Furthermore,
in the United States, we have a banking system where the Federal Reserve, at
the central level, not at the state level, decides which banks are in trouble
and need assistance, or in the worst case, require resolution.
A banking union, in fact, is
an important kind of risk sharing — a kind of subset of a fiscal union.
What concerns the Germans
about a fiscal union — or, for that matter, a banking union — is that it
pledges German citizens to support peripheral Eurozone economies and banks that
are at risk of outright collapse. The fear in Germany is that risk-sharing will
become risk-shifting — and that a fiscal union will become a transfer union.
In short, Germany, and other
core Eurozone nations like The Netherlands, don't want to get stuck in a
transfer union where they might be forced to subsidize Portugal and Italy and
Greece and Spain forever. Fiscal unions and banking unions only work when
shocks occur randomly. (One day I have bad luck in Texas; the next day you have
bad luck in New York. Sometimes I help you out; other times, you help me.) If
the economies within a fiscal union are not balanced — it's not a two-sided
risk-sharing alliance but, rather, a risk-shifting scheme where one side passes
money to the other forever.
That is why the Germans, among
other core European nations, have been saying, in essence, unless the PIGS
countries do reform in the form of fiscal austerity, structural reform, boost
their growth, and make progress on avoiding future debt crises, we’re not
going to sign on to a fiscal union or a banking union that may become an
economic suicide pact.
9) Political Union — And
Democratic Legitimacy in the Eurozone
Court of Justice, Luxemburg
Source: skynrg.com
Source: skynrg.com
While Americans are
accustomed to political squabbling — such as the commentary we hear from
talking heads every presidential election about Red States and Blue States —
the fundamental democratic legitimacy of American politics is rarely questioned
by those within the political mainstream in the United States.
Supranational unions like the
Eurozone — at there very core — are about transferring national sovereignty to
the center.
In the case of the Eurozone,
decisions that were once made at the national level get made at the
supranational level. What was once decided by national legislatures of
countries gets decided at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, while
the executive powers of the EU are in Brussels within the European Commission.
Decisions that were formerly handed down by national supreme courts get judged
at The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. And monetary policy that was
executed by national central banks gets made by the ECB in Frankfurt, Germany.
What impact does this have on
the political legitimacy of democracies?
If you are transferring
national sovereignty from the nation state toward super-national authority,
then you need a political union where those decisions being made at the
super-national level are done in a democratic way. Otherwise, there are great
challenges: For example the EU tells you that your country's budget is not
acceptable and needs to be cut, or the ECB informs you that several of your
national banks need to be shut down.
Decisions on budgets and bank
supervision have already moved away from national capitals to the central
authority — but the risk sharing component of fiscal and economic union never
arrived. You might say that countries like Greece have lost their sovereignty
on supervision and regulation without truly receiving the benefits of
solidarity, i.e. risk-sharing.
Bureaucrats that were never
elected by Greek citizens have begun making decisions that most Greeks would
prefer to be made democratically in Athens, and many have already begun to
blame their woes on the EU and the ECB and the Eurozone.
The issue, of course, brings
us back to where we began our list: The rise of extremist political parties
within the Eurozone.
Beyond Greece — in Spain and
Italy and France and The Netherlands — populist parties on the right and the
left are rising. And their rage is being channeled toward many of the same
targets that extremist politics railed against during The Great Depression:
Against globalization, against immigration, against reform, against austerity.
They are saying, "Enough is enough." So far, they have not come to
power.
But after five years of recession, low growth, high unemployment, little
job creation, little income creation, more and more people have begun to say,
"Enough is enough."
As their voices grow louder,
and the political legitimacy of the Eurozone is questioned in more places,
those with a keen sense of history begin to worry about the causes that made
Europeans feel powerless within the political order of the 1930s— economic
depression, stock market shocks, the wrong monetary and fiscal policies leading
to deflation — that led to Europe falling into the clutches of authoritarian regimes and culminating in the Second World War.
The Future of the
Eurozone
Source: The Telegraph
As 2014 drew to a close, I
started thinking about all the things I've written about the Eurozone over the
last decade. One of the more provocative ways of summing up the challenges that
the Eurozone faces would be to say that in this world, economies can grow
either because they have lots of young people willing to work long hard hours,
or grow because people are creative and innovate.
Barring a few exceptions,
these are, essentially, the two different paths economies can take to growth.
Asia, broadly speaking, has taken the path of working very hard. (Though
Americans work quite hard, they don’t work as many hours as their counterparts
in Asia do.) But, in many key ways, Americans continue to lead the world in
innovation and technological advances.
Europe, at this moment in
history, is “the worst of both worlds” in this respect. Leisure and vacation
time are of paramount importance to Europeans, but there is a dearth of
innovation to make up for those losses in productivity. (Only isolated elements
in core Eurozone nations follow American-style work patterns.) What Europe does
have—and what continues to drive the major engine of European tourism—is high
culture. Rich Chinese and Indian vacationers flock there to soak up churches
and concerts and ruins.
If Europe wants to avoid
becoming the Florida of the world—a peninsula full of vacationers and retirees—then
it must urgently consider radical reforms. All of the nine points noted above
are worthy of serious action by policymakers. And all should be in the minds of
investors considering taking a risk on the Eurozone and its future.
Cordially,
Nouriel Roubini
Chairman
Roubini's Edge
Chairman
Roubini's Edge
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